The Czech army has long enjoyed a high level of public trust, much like other uniformed services. In recent months, however, public trust in the army has slightly risen, bringing it closer to the police, whose trust ratings have, conversely, slightly fallen.
Confidence in the army’s ability to fulfill its core mission—ensuring the country’s external security—has also risen to a historic high year-on-year. “Think of it this way: if I ask whether you trust a friend you’ve known since elementary school, you’d probably say yes. But if I ask whether you trust him in his profession—that he does his job well, for example—then doubts may arise. That’s why we ask about trust in the military twice. First, about general trust, and then in this specific way,” explains STEM analyst Jiří Táborský. The questions regarding NATO are structured similarly: first, whether there is general trust in NATO, and then whether NATO is capable of ensuring our external security—which, according to the majority of Czechs, it is.
“Do you trust the following institutions?”: Czech Army, Czech Police
Note: The options “definitely” and “rather yes” displayed in %
Data source: STEM – Trends 1997–2026
“Do you have trust in the capabilities of the Czech Armed Forces when it comes to ensuring the country’s external security?”
Data source: STEM – Trends 2024–2026
“Do you trust NATO’s capabilities when it comes to ensuring the country’s external security?”
Data source: STEM – Trends 2024–2026
However, public trust in the military is strongly politically conditioned, which is a phenomenon that emerged only with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine—a trend that STEM has been highlighting for several years now. “In 2020, people generally trusted the military regardless of their political affiliation. But as soon as the military and the war became a major political issue, society began to polarize. We consider this very dangerous, because in the event of a crisis, the military is there for everyone, regardless of political preferences. And it would be very appropriate if it was perceived that way,” explains Táborský.
“Do you trust the following institutions?”: The Czech Army
Note: The options “definitely” and “rather yes” displayed in % (January 2026: vote in the October 2025 Chamber of Deputies elections)
Data source: STEM – Trends 2018–2026
Considering the political debate and developments at the international stage, particularly within the NATO, it is crucial to monitor the Czech public’s attitudes toward defense spending. Years ago, Czechia committed to investing 2% of its GDP annually in defense. However, last year this commitment was increased to 5% of GDP, of which 3.5% is to go toward projects directly related to the military and defense capabilities, such as the purchase of ammunition, equipment, soldier training, and other items. The remaining 1.5% is to go toward a broader range of projects that are related to defense capabilities in various ways, such as repairs of roads, bridges, and railways, cybersecurity, and other areas.
However, there is a lack of support among Czech men and women for such extensive defense spending. The largest segment of the population—nearly 40%—prefers to maintain the current level of 2%. About a quarter of people believe we should spend around 3% of GDP on defense. On the other hand, more than a tenth thinks we’re spending too much on defense and that we should spend less. Of the remainder, most have no opinion, and only a minority believes we should spend 5%. “To put it simply, about a third of people are open to some increase in spending. And the majority of them are voters of the previous governing coalition. We also see a year-over-year decline in the number of people who think defense spending is excessive. Nevertheless, the main preference remains maintaining the 2% level,” summarizes Táborský.
Opinions on this issue vary significantly depending on political preferences. While voters of the former coalition are mostly in favor of increasing defense spending—particularly among voters of SPOLU—we see significant differences among voters of the current governing parties. “The situation is similar to the perception of Ukraine. SPD voters are strictly opposed to increasing defense spending. The ANO movement is somewhere in the middle, and Motoristé voters are the most inclined to support increased defense spending,” concludes Táborský.
“In 2024/2025, Czechia spent 2% of its GDP on defense. Which of the following approaches to defense funding in Czechia best reflects your opinion?”
Source: STEM – Trendy Series 01/2025, 06/2025, 01/2026
“In 2024/2025, Czechia spent 2% of its GDP on defense. Which of the following approaches to defense funding in Czechia best reflects your opinion?”
Source: STEM – Trendy Series 01/2025, 06/2025, 01/2026
Note: The data show the distribution of the population into those who support maintaining, reducing, or increasing defense spending, or who have no opinion on the matter, based on the responses from the previous chart.
“In 2024/2025, Czechia spent 2% of its GDP on defense. Which of the following approaches to defense funding in Czechia best reflects your opinion?”
Source: STEM – Trendy Series 01/2026
Note: The data show the distribution of the population among those who support maintaining, reducing, or increasing defense spending, or who have no opinion on the matter, based on the responses from the previous chart.
The cited research by the STEM Insitute for Empirical Research (www.stem.cz) was conducted on a representative sample of the Czech population aged 18 and older between January 16th and 23rd, 2026. Respondents were selected using a quota sampling method. A total of 1,061 respondents answered the questions through a combination of online and in-person interviews (CAWI+CAPI). Data from other surveys in the Trends series, which are conducted using the same methodology on a sample of approximately 1,000 respondents, were also utilized.
